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【質問】
戦略学のカリキュラムを教えられたし．
【回答】
戦略学 第一週目
出された質問が，
●What is strategy and how does it 'work'?
●What did Michael Howard mean by the forgotten
dimension of strategy?
●Can excellence in one or two dimensions
compensate for lack of exxcellence in others?
の三つ．これに答えるために，以下の論文を読みます．
１，Why strategy is Difficult? by Colin S.
Gray
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0422.pdf
２，Is Straegy Illusion? Richard K. Betts
http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/isec_25_02_5_0.pdf
３，The Trouble with Strategy by Richard
K. Betts
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0729.pdf
４，RMAs and the Dimensions of Strategy by
Colin S. Gray
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1117pgs.pdf
５，クラウゼヴィッツの『戦争論』の１，２，３，８章
６，David Jablonsky "Why Is Strategy
Difficult?" in Gary Guertner, ed, THE
SEARCH FOR STRATEGY(1993)
７，Michael Howard "The Forgotten Dimensions
of Strategy " in FOREIGN AFFAIRS(Summer
1979)
８，Colin S. Gray "Modern Strategy"
第一章
１，Why strategy is Difficult? by Colin S.
Gray
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0422.pdf
この中でX先生は戦略（strategy）が難しい理由を五つ挙げております．
①政策（policy）と軍事（military）の橋渡し役だから．
②とにかくその性質上，複雑になりがち．
③戦略家をトレーニングして育てることは不可能→経験のみ
④重要な要素，面が多すぎる
⑤敵が何をやってくるのか，何を考えているのかを知ることがほとんど不可能．
その他に，いくらテクノロジーが進化しても戦争の霧（fog
of war）＝不確実性，を消すことができないこと，そして今のほうがいろいろな要素を考えなければならないので，実行するのが難しい，などと書いております．
●What did Michael Howard mean by the forgotten
dimension of strategy?
この質問の答えなんですが，マイケル・ハワード氏※は，クラウゼヴィッツになぞらえて，戦略には四つの面がある，としております．その四つの面とは，
①logistial（補給）の面．
②operational（実行）の面．
③social（社会）の面
④technological （技術）の面
です．
この論文が書かれたの１９７９年なんですが，核戦略を引き合いに出しながら，アメリカは戦略における技術的な面ばかりを強調しすぎる傾向があり，ソ連や中国のように社会的な面を統一することを全く考えていない，ということを語っております．
※ハワード氏の略歴です．英国保守党の中の人とは別人なので念のため．
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bassford/Chapter21.htm#VanCreveld
Sir Michael Eliot Howard (1922-). Howard,
whose education was interrupted by World
War Two, served as a captain in the Coldstream
Guards and won the Military Cross in 1943.
He began teaching history in 1947 at King's
College, London. He first read Clausewitz
(in the Graham translation) in 1953 when
he was appointed lecturer in war studies.
I was initially most impressed by his concept
of "friction," and the importance
of moral forces as a means to overcome it.
This related very directly to my own wartime
experiences, and made me realize that what
I had been through was a universal phenomenon
in military affairs. Only very much later
did I become interested in his teaching about
the connection between war and politics.
Fundamentally he appealed to me, and still
does, because of his success in explaining
the limitations of intellectualizing about
war. It is an aspect of his teaching that
I find still goes down very well in lecturing
to the Services, and quite often leads them
actually to read him. (47)
Howard moved to Oxford in 1968 and was appointed
to the Chichele chair in 1977, serving as
Spenser Wilkinson's successor as professor
of the history of war until 1980. Howard
has been particularly successful at implanting
a respect for Clausewitz in his students,
who have come to dominate British military
studies. A number of his protégés
have contributed to the English-language
literature specifically on Clausewitz. (48)
In 1980, Howard moved up to the even more
prestigious Regius Professorship of Modern
History and thence to Yale in 1989, as the
first Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military
and Naval History. From Yale, he has moved
on to the Institute for Advanced Study at
Princeton.
戦略学：第一週
Seminar 1: Strategy
David A. Baldwin “Security Studies and the
End of the Cold War”, World Politics (October
1995)
John Baylis et al Contemporary Strategy,
I, Theories and Concepts (1987), esp. chs.1-2
John Baylis and
John Garnett, eds Makers of Nuclear Strategy
(1991)
John Baylis et al, eds Strategy in the Contemporary
World (2002)
Richard K. Betts “Should Strategic Studies
Survive?” World Politics (Oct 1997)
Richard K. Betts “Is Strategy an Illusion?”
International Security (Fall 2000)
Richard K. Betts “The Trouble With Strategy”,
Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 2001-2002)
Brian Bond The Pursuit of Victory (1996)
Ken Booth and Eric Herring Keyguide to Information
Sources in Strategic Studies (1994)
Bernard Brodie War and Politics (1973)
Bernard Brodie “The Scientific Strategists,”
in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright,
eds, Scientists and National Policy-Making
(1964)
Carl H. Builder The Masks of War: American
Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis
(1989)
Barry Buzan People, States and Fear: An Agenda
for International Security Studies in the
Post-Cold War Era (1991)
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic
Studies: Military Technology and International
Relations (1987)
Barry Buzan et al., Security: A New framework
for Analysis (1998)
Carl H. Builder The Masks of War: American
Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis
(1989)
Carl von Clausewitz On War (Michael Howard
and Peter Paret trans.) (1832, 1976, 1993)
Martin van Creveld The Transformation of
War (1991)
Colin S. Gray “New Directions for Security
Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice?”
Security Studies (Summer 1992)
Colin S. Gray War, Peace and Victory: Strategy
and Statecraft for the New Century (1990)
Colin S. Gray Explorations in Strategy (1996)
Colin S. Gray Modern Strategy (1999)
Colin S. Gray Strategic Studies: a Critical
Assessment (1982)
Colin S. Gray Strategic Studies and Public
Policy: The American Experience (1982)
Colin S. Gray “Across the Nuclear Divide:
Strategic Studies Past and Present,” International
Security (Summer 1977)
Colin S. Gray “Villains, Victims and Sheriffs:
Strategic Studies and Security for an Interwar
Period,” Comparative Strategy (October-December
1994)
Colin S. Gray “Why Strategy is Difficult”,
Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1999)
Philip Green Deadly Logic: The Theory of
Nuclear Deterrence (1966)
Michael I. Handel Masters of War: Classical
Strategic Thought, 2nd and 3rd edns. (1996,
2000)
Michael Howard “The Classical Strategists,”
in Howard, Studies in War and Peace (1970)
Michael Howard “The Forgotten Dimensions
of Strategy,” in Howard, The Causes of Wars
(1983)
David Jablonsky “ Why is Strategy so Difficult?”
in Gary L. Guertner, ed., The Search for
Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision (1993)
Richard W. Jones “Message in a Bottle? Theory
and Praxis in Critical Security Studies”,
Contemporary Security Policy (December 1995)
Fred Kaplan The Wizards of Armageddon (1983)
Bradley S. Klein Strategic Studies and World
Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence
(1994)
Keith Krause and
Michael C. Williams, eds Critical Security
Studies: Concepts and Cases 1997)
Bradford A. Lee &
Karl F. Walling, eds. Strategic Logic and
Political Rationality (2003)
Robert A. Levine The Arms Debate (1963)
Robert A. Levine Still The Arms Debate (1990)
Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed On Security (1995)
A. W. Marshall et al, eds On Not Confusing
Ourselves (1991)
Anatol Rapoport Strategy and Conscience (1964)
Terry Terriff et al Security Studies Today
(1999)
Stephen M. Walt “The Search for a Science
of Strategy”, International Security (Summer
1987)
John J. Weltman World Politics and the Evolution
of War (1995)
J.C. Wylie Military Strategy: A General Theory
of Power Control (1967, 1986)
戦略学 第二週目
１，"Clausewitz, History, and the Future
Strategic World" by Colin S. Gray
http://www.army.mod.uk/img/doctrine/scsi47.pdf
２，"Can Reading Clausewitz Save us
from Future Mistakes?" by Bruce Fleming
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/04spring/fleming.pdf
３，戦争論，第一巻と第八巻
４，Modern Strategy by コリン・グレイ 第三章
５，Peter Paret "Makers of Modern Strategy"
のクラウゼヴィッツの章
６，"Clausewitz" by Michael Howard
７，"Reading Clausewitz" by Beatrice
Heuser
４ではクラウゼヴィッツについてがテーマなのですが，この戦略思想家の「弱点」が述べられています．
①アイディアが細かいところまで煮詰まっていない（未完ですから当然といえばそうなのですが・・・）
②戦略の「三位一体」が勘違いされやすい．
③「戦争は政策の継続である」という“政策”（policy/politik）は何かをほとんど解説していない．
④「戦争と政策」の関係についての公式が，かなり未完成である．
⑤「戦争論」は，国家中心的な見方である（リアリストすぎる）
⑥その当時のドイツ（プロシア）の状況（ナポレオンとの戦争における事実など）にとらわれすぎている．
⑦「敵」についての考察がほとんどない．
⑧「戦略」の定義が，やたらと軍事戦略だけに偏りすぎ．
⑨「戦争の目的」が軍事に偏りすぎ．
⑩「防御のほうが有利」というが，これはドイツのようなランドパワーのときだけにしか当てはまらない．他の「～パワー」では，すべて攻撃のほうが有利．
⑪「重力の中心」（center of gravity）という概念の説明があまりにも物理的だ．
⑫絶対的戦争（殲滅戦争）と現実の戦争（制限戦争）の概念がうまく調和できていない．
⑬「戦争になったら情報は当てにならない」と書いて間違った教育をした．
⑭戦争の原因，政策の目標，国政術については何も書いていない．「戦争とは政策のことだ」とあるのに，肝心の「政策」については何も書かれていない．
⑮戦争の倫理について弱い．戦争を美化してはいないが，戦争をある種の必要悪と考えているため攻撃されやすい．
⑯兵站や補給について何も書いていない．
⑰海戦についてはほとんど触れていない．
⑱「天才」「決定的な点」という言葉があやふやだ．
⑲ゲリラ戦に関する理論が弱い．
⑳文章が読みづらいために，余計な誤解を招いた．
などなどです．
戦略学 第五週目
１，Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance
of Ideas in Security Studies
Michael C. Desch
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1. (Summer,
1998), pp. 141-170
http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/printpage/01622889/di008163/00p0061k/0.pdf?backcontext=table-of-contents&dowhat=Acrobat&config=jstor&userID=86e1b9be@reading.ac.uk/01cc99333c005015cf3f8&0.pdf
２，Thinking about Strategic Culture
Alastair Iain Johnston
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4. (Spring,
1995), pp. 32-64.
http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/printpage/01622889/di008150/00p0150f/0.pdf?backcontext=table-of-contents&dowhat=Acrobat&config=jstor&userID=86e1b9be@reading.ac.uk/01cc99333c005015cf3f8&0.pdf
３，Military Culture Does Matter
Volume 7, Number 2
January 1999 by Williamson Murray
http://www.fpri.org/fpriwire/0702.199901.murray.militaryculturedoesmatter.html
戦略学 第六週目
１，Revisiting Mackinder and Angell: The
Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics by
CHRISTOPHER J. FETTWEIS A1
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?wasp=2724frwwwh1rrwaupj4p&referrer=parent&backto=issue,1,8;journal,7,18;linkingpublicationresults,1:102435,1
２，The continued primacy of geography -
A Debate on Geopolitics
ORBIS, Spring, 1996 by Colin S. Gray
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0365/is_n2_v40/ai_18338849/pg_1
３，Military Power: Explaining Victory and
Defeat in Modern Battle
by Stephen D. Biddle
４，Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy
~Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Sloan
５，Democratic Ideas and Reality
~H. Mackinder
戦略学 第九週目
１，the art of war in World History p991-1064
２，Lwrence Freedman 'The Evolution of Nuclear
History'
３，---------------- 'Dterrnece'
４，Colin S. Gray 'Modern Strategy' chs.
11-12.
５，------------- 'Maintaining Effective
Deterrence'
６，Keith B. Payne 'Deterrence in the Second
Nuclear Age'
７，-------------- 'The Fallacies of Cold
War Deterrence and a New Direction'
８，Robert Jervis 'The Meaning of Neclear
Revolution' ch 12.
９，Donald H. Rumsfeld 'Annual report (2002')
ch.7
戦略学：第十週目
質問
１，ＲＭＡ，軍事改革とは何か？
２，なぜＲＭＡは９０年代において“concept
of choice”だったのか？
３，ＲＭＡセオリーは歴史的にも妥当な議論？
必読文献
１，A Revolution in Warfare
Eliot A. Cohen
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996
A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE
TECHNOLOGY STRIKES AGAIN
For almost a decade American defense planners
have foreseen an impending revolution in
military affairs, sometimes described as
the military-technical revolution. Such a
transformation would open the way for a fundamental
reordering of American defense posture. It
might lead, for example, to a drastic shrinking
of the military, a casting aside of old forms
of organization and creation of new ones,
a slashing of current force structure, and
the investment of unusually large sums in
research and development.
Such a revolution would touch virtually all
aspects of the military establishment. Cruise
missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles would
replace fighter planes and tanks as chess
pieces in the game of military power. Today's
military organizations divisions, fleets,
and air wings--could disappear or give way
to successors that would look very different.
And if the forces themselves changed, so
too would the people, as new career possibilities,
educational requirements, and promotion paths
became essential. New elites would gain in
importance: "information warriors,"
for example, might supplant tankers and fighter
pilots as groups from which the military
establishment draws the bulk of its leaders.
The proponents of this view have turned to
history to illustrate--and in some measure
to create--their theory of radical change.
It is, therefore, proper to ask whether the
historical record substantiates their claims.[1]
Most soldiers, in their heart of hearts,
would agree with Cyril Falls, a military
historian of an older generation, who noted
in his 1953 work A Hundred Years of War,
1850-1950:
Observers constantly describe the warfare
of their own age as marking a revolutionary
breach in the normal progress of methods
of warfare. Their selection of their own
age ought to put readers and listeners on
their guard. . . . It is a fallacy, due to
ignorance of technical and tactical military
history, to suppose that methods of warfare
have not made continuous and, on the whole,
fairly even progress.
The cautious military historian (and even
more cautious soldier) looks askance at prophets
of radical change, although by no means at
change itself. Unquestionably, military technology
has never stood still. In the eighteenth
century, for example, minor improvements
in the design and manufacture of gun barrels
and carriages, coupled with the standardization
of cannon calibers, laid the groundwork for
the vastly improved cannonades of the armies
of the French Revolution and Empire. At the
same time, on closer inspection the apparently
rapid rate of change in modern warfare may
prove deceptive. Despite the attention the
press lavished on "smart" bombs
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example,
most of the ordnance in that conflict consisted
of 1950s-technology unguided bombs dropped
by aircraft developed in the 1960s or in
some cases 1970s. This being so, whence comes
the contention that the United States is
undergoing a revolution in military affairs?
THE RUSSIANS SAW IT COMING
Beginning in the early 1980s Soviet observers
led by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then chief
of the general staff, advanced the notion
of an imminent technical revolution that
would give conventional weapons a level of
effectiveness in the field comparable to
that of small tactical nuclear weapons. Armor
on the march might find itself detected and
attacked by conventional missiles showering
self-guided antitank weapons, in an operation
conducted from a distance of several hundred
miles and with as little as 30 minutes between
detection and assault. The Soviets found
their reading of the military future profoundly
disheartening, since it promised to thwart
their strategy in case of war in Western
Europe, which rested on the orderly forward
movement of massed echelons of tanks and
armored vehicles. They realized, moreover,
that their country, incapable of manufacturing
a satisfactory personal computer, could not
possibly keep up in an arms race driven by
the information technologies.
Soviet conceptions of a military-technical
revolution seeped into the West, chiefly
through the U.S. Department of Defense and
its Office of Net Assessment. It gradually
became clear that the Soviets had portrayed
the revolution too narrowly. They had focused
on one type of warfare in a single theater
armored conflict in Central Europe and concentrated
almost exclusively, as be fitted the materialism
of Marxist-Leninist thought, on technology
and weapons rather than the organizational
dimension of warfare. With the groundwork
laid for an American assessment, the 1991
war with Iraq crystallized awareness among
military planners in the United States on
this momentous issue.
Many exponents of air power declared that
in the Persian Gulf War the technology had
finally caught up with the promise of air
operations, first articulated in the period
between the world wars; the revolution, they
said, was in the realization of the So-year
quest for the decisive application of air
power in war. Yet the conduct of the war
against Iraq had very little to do with the
kinds of operations envisaged by the original
theorists of air warfare. No theorist in
the 1920s imagined it would be possible to
take down telecommunications systems or to
conduct extensive attacks in densely populated
areas without killing many civilians. The
Gulf War showed air power off to great advantage
but in extremely favorable circumstances:
the United States brought to bear a force
sized and trained to fight the Soviet Union
in a global war, obtained the backing of
almost every major military and financial
power, and chose the time and place at which
combat would begin in a theater ideally suited
to air operations. Knowledgeable observers
remained skeptical that a revolution had
taken place.
A third version of the revolution has come
from the American military. Admiral William
Owens, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, has written of a "system of
systems"--a world in which the many
kinds of sensors, from satellites to shipborne
radar, from unmanned aerial vehicles to remotely
planted acoustic devices, will provide information
to any military user who needs it. Thus a
helicopter might launch a missile at a tank
a dozen miles away based on information derived
from airborne radar or satellite imagery.
In this view the revolution in military affairs
consists of the United States' astounding
and unprecedented ability to amass and evaluate
enormous quantities of information about
any given battle arena--Owens has referred
to a 200-mile-by-200-mile box and make near-instantaneous
use of it.
Ground soldiers are particularly dubious
about the system of systems. They wonder
whether any technologist can disperse what
Carl von Clausewitz called the fog of war
and ask what will happen when an opponent
attempts to conceal its force or attacks
the information systems that observe it.
Even in naval warfare, where the system of
systems originated, sea and storm can make
it difficult to know all that goes on in
a box of the kind described by Owens. The
admiral's version of the military revolution
focuses almost entirely on technology rather
than on the less tangible aspects of warfare.
As yet, it bespeaks an aspiration, not a
reality, and it is predicated on the inability
of other countries to systematically deny
the United States the information its weapons
systems need.
The Soviet, air power, and Owens versions
of the revolution in military affairs all
offer only partial insights into a larger
set of changes. A revolution has indeed begun.
But it will be shaped by powerful forces
emanating from beyond the domain of warfare.
It will, moreover, represent the culmination
in modern military organizations of a variety
of developments, some of them dating back
decades. To understand it, one must begin
with its origins.
REVOLUTION FROM THE OUTSIDE
From time to time dramatic changes in warfare
occur as a consequence of forces endogenous
to war. Military research and development
programs gave birth to the nuclear revolution,
and although space exploration has many civilian
spinoffs, military resources drove it in
its early phases. Submarine warfare, which
gave weaker naval powers a tremendously potent
tool against stronger ones, also originated
in the military. Just as often, however,
the driving forces behind a change in the
conduct of war lie in the realms of political
and economic life.
The transformation of warfare in the nineteenth
century offers a particularly useful analogy
for contemporary strategists. Describing
the posture of Austria and Prussia at the
outset of the French Revolution, Clausewitz
noted in On War that the two countries resorted
to the kind of limited war that the previous
century had made familiar in Europe. However,
they soon discovered its inadequacy . . .
. People at first expected to have to deal
only with a seriously weakened French army;
but in 1793 a force appeared that beggared
all imagination. Suddenly war again became
the business of the people--a people of thirty
millions, all of whom considered themselves
to be citizens . . . . The resources and
efforts now available for use surpassed all
conventional limits; nothing now impeded
the vigor with which war could be waged,
and consequently the opponents of France
faced the utmost peril.
The advent of broadly based conscription
greatly enlarged armies and increased their
durability. The secret of the success of
the French revolutionary armies lay not in
their skill on the battlefield--the reviews
there are mixed--but in the new regime's
ability to replenish its forces repeatedly
after defeat and in the opening of military
advancement to all classes of citizen. The
age of the mass army had arrived.
Civilian technologies have also brought revolutionary
change in warfare. The mass-produced rifle
of the nineteenth century complicated the
task of military tacticians enormously, while
the appearance of the railroad and telegraph
altered war even more. Generals could shuttle
armies from one theater to another in weeks,
a feat demonstrated in spectacular fashion
during the Civil War when the Union shifted
25,000 troops, with artillery and baggage,
over 1,100 miles of rail lines from Virginia
to Chattanooga, Tennessee, in less than 12
days. Furthermore, the railroad, in conjunction
with the mass army, made mobilization at
the outset of war a critical element in the
efficiency of a military organization.
The telegraph affected not only armies and
governments but newspapers. It helped general
staffs coordinate rapid mobilization and
launch large military movements. Even more
important, the rapid dissemination of news
transformed the nature of civil-military
relations in wartime, creating new opportunities
for tension. Politicians discovered, to their
consternation, that the literate publics
of modern states could learn of events on
the battlefield almost immediately from mass
circulation newspapers. At the same time,
generals discovered that political leaders
could now communicate with them in the field,
and would gladly do so. During the Civil
War the Union established a military telegraph
system, laying some 15,000 miles of wires,
but placed it under civilian control rather
than the Army Signal Corps'; Secretary, of
War Edwin M. Stanton made certain the lines
terminated in his office, not that of the
army's senior general. With knowledge came
intervention--or interference, as many a
Union general keenly felt it. As the wars
of German unification went on, Field Marshal
Helmuth Graf von Moltke felt the same way
about the suggestions Bismarck telegraphed
his subordinates, and attempted to restrict
the information flowing over the wires to
higher headquarters.
The contemporary revolution in military affairs,
like those of the nineteenth century, has
its origins in the civilian world, and in
two developments in particular. The first
is the rise of information technologies,
which have transformed economic and social
life in ways that hardly need elaboration.
The consequences for military organizations
are numerous; the development of intelligent
weapons that can guide themselves to their
targets is only one, and not necessarily
the most important. The variety and ever-expanding
capabilities of intelligence-gathering machines
and the ability of computers to bring together
and distribute to users the masses of information
from these sources stem from the information
revolution. Small wonder that a group of
senior Marine Corps officers, led by the
assistant commandant of the corps, visited
the New York Stock Exchange recently to learn
how brokers absorb, process, and transmit
the vast quantities of perishable information
that are the lifeblood of the financial markets.
The efflorescence of capitalism in the United
States and abroad constitutes a second driving
force. In the years after World War II, even
Western nations spent a great deal of their
national wealth on defense and created vast
state bureaucracies to provide for every
military need and function. Today very few
states can successfully resist the pressures
of postindustrial capitalism. Military dimensions
include the sale of government-owned defense
industries around the world and the increasing
privatization of military functions; private
contractors, for instance, handled much of
the logistics for the U.S. operations in
Haiti and Somalia. In a world where commercial
satellites can deliver images of a quality
that only a few years ago was the prerogative
of the superpowers, military organizations
are more and more willing to use civilian
systems for military communications and even
intelligence gathering rather than spend
to develop their own. Furthermore, the end
of the Cold War has freed up the markets
in military goods and services. Countries
can gain access to a wide spectrum of military
capabilities for ready cash, including the
services of skilled personnel to maintain
and perhaps operate high-technology weapons.
For much of this century armed forces could
ignore the market, practicing a kind of military
socialism in a sea of capitalism; no longer.
To know what the revolution in military affairs
will look like, we need the answers to four
questions. Will it change the appearance
of combat? Will it change the structure of
armies? Will it lead to the rise of new military
elites? Will it alter countries' power position?
Reflection on each of these suggests that
this is the eve of a far-reaching change
in warfare whose outlines are only dimly
visible but real nonetheless.
THE FORMS OF COMBAT
A transformation of combat means change in
the fundamental relationship between offense
and defense, space and time, fire and maneuver.
The advent of carrier-based warfare provides
an example. Warfare in the age of battleships
took place within visual range, between tightly
drilled formations of ships of the line that
battered each other with their big guns.
Once carriers came on the scene, fleets struck
at one another from hundreds of miles away,
and their blows were not repeated salvos
but massed air raids; fighting now depended
on "one large pulse of firepower unleashed
upon the arrival of the air wing at the target,"
as Wayne Hughes put it in his 1986 Fleet
Tactics. The firepower revolution of the
late nineteenth century rested on the adoption
of the rifle and subsequent improvement of
the weapon with smokeless powder, breechloading,
and metal cartridges. In short order the
densely packed battlefield of the early American
Civil War gave way to the empty battlefield
of modern times, in which small groups of
soldiers scurry from shellhole to shellhole,
eschewing the massed rush that dominated
tactics for almost two centuries.
Today the forms of combat have begun a change
no less dramatic. A military cliche has it
that what can be seen on the modern battlefield
can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed.
Whereas at the beginning of the century this
applied with deadly certainty only to front-line
infantrymen, it now holds not only for machines
on the front lines but for supporting forces
in the rear. The introduction of long-range
precision weapons, delivered by plane or
missile, together with the development of
intelligent mines that can be activated from
a remote location, means that sophisticated
armies can inflict unprecedented levels of
destruction on any large armored force on
the move. Fixed sites are also increasingly
vulnerable.
The colossal maneuvers of the coalition armies
in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq in 1991
may in retrospect appear, like the final
charges of cavalry in the nineteenth century,
an anomaly in the face of modern firepower.
Future warfare may be more a gigantic artillery
duel fought with exceptionally sophisticated
munitions than a chesslike game of maneuver
and positioning. As all countries gain access
to the new forms of air power (space-based
reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles),
hiding large-scale armored movements or building
up safe rear areas chock-a-block with ammunition
dumps and truck convoys will gradually become
impossible.
From the middle of the nineteenth century
until very recently, platforms dominated
warfare: the newest ship, plane, or tank
outclassed its rivals and in most cases speedily
rendered them obsolete. But this was not
always the case. Until the 1830s, for example,
naval technology remained roughly where it
had been since the mid-eighteenth century.
Nelson's Victory was laid down in 1759, launched
in 1765, served brilliantly at Trafalgar
in 1805, and was paid off only in 1835--a
service life of 70 years. Steam propulsion
and metal construction changed all that,
and a period of near-constant technological
change ensued, in which naval superiority
seemed to shift rapidly from power to power
depending on who had the most recently built
warship.
The wheel has now turned again. The platform
has become less important, while the quality
of what it carries--sensors, munitions, and
electronics of all kinds--has become critical.
A modernized 30-year-old aircraft armed with
the latest long-range air-to-air missile,
cued by an airborne warning plane, can defeat
a craft a third its age but not so equipped
or guided. In a world dominated by long-range,
intelligent precision weapons, the first
blow can prove decisive; the collapse of
the Iraqi air defense system, in 1991 within
a few hours of a sophisticated air attack
is a case in point. As a result, incentives
for preemption may grow. For two duelists
armed with swords approaching each other
from a dozen yards' distance, it makes little
difference who unsheathes his weapon first.
Give them pistols, however, and all odds
favor the man quicker on the draw.
Furthermore, the nature of preemption itself
may change. To the extent that information
warfare, including the sabotage of computer
systems, emerges as a new type of combat,
the first blow may be covert, a precursor
to more open and conventional hostilities.
Such attacks--to which an information-dependent
society like the United States is particularly
vulnerable--could have many purposes: blinding,
intimidating, diverting, or simply confusing
an opponent. They could carry as well the
threat of bringing war to a country's homeland
and people, and thus even up the balance
for countries that do not possess the conventional
tools of long-range attack, such as missiles
and bombers. How such wars initiated by information
strikes would play themselves out is a matter
of tremendous uncertainty.
THE STRUCTURE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
It is not merely the tools of warfare but
the organizations that wield them that make
for revolutionary change in war. The invention
of the tank--itself a cluster of technologies--did
not bring about the armored warfare revolution,
nor did the acquisition of tanks in quantity
allow countries to exploit the new technology
equally. The raw conceptual ingredients for
blitzkrieg existed as early as 1918, when
J.F.C. Fuller devised Plan 1919 for the British
army as it prepared its final assault into
Germany. But it took armed forces more than
20 years to put the ideas into practice.
The Germans had fewer (and in some respects
inferior) tanks in 1940 than the British
and French. They succeeded not because of
material superiority but because they got
several things right--supporting technologies
such as tank radios, organization, operational
concepts, and a proper climate or culture
of command.
The construction of the Panzer division reflected
a careful working out of the requirements
of modern warfare. Whereas the French and
British created armored divisions consisting
almost exclusively of tanks, the Germans
made theirs combined arms organizations built
around the tank. The Germans saw the need
for units of engineers and infantry to accompany
the tanks, allowing them to develop their
striking power to the fullest. To enable
the new organizations to function, the German
military had to cultivate a particular climate
of command. An American liaison officer in
the 1930s noted that the Germans made decisions
with far less preparation than their American
counterparts:
The Germans point out, that often a Commander
must make an important decision after only
a few minutes' deliberation and emphasize,
that a fair decision given in time for aggressive
execution is much better than one wholly
right but too late. They visualize rapidly
changing situations in modern warfare and
are gearing their command and staff operations
accordingly.[2]
Fortunately for the Germans, the Panzer division
fit well with pre-armored doctrine and military
culture. The contemporary revolution in military
affairs may require similar but more painful
evolution. Armed forces do not know what
the Panzer division of the future will look
like, much less how to create it, but one
can advance some tentative descriptions of
the military of the next century. To begin
with, the new military will rest primarily
on long voluntary service. The balance between
quality and quantity has shifted in favor
of quality, and it is no mere drive for economy
(because professional militaries are not
cheap) that has led countries either to give
up conscription or to create two separate
militaries, one conscript and one professional,
with ever more attention and resources going
to the latter. At long last, after a reign
of almost two centuries, the age of the mass
military manned by short-service conscripts
and equipped with the products of high-volume
military manufacturing is coming to an end.
The new military will be an increasingly
joint force--or perhaps, one might say, less
and less a traditional, service-oriented
force. In militaries around the world the
traditional division into armies, navies,
and air' forces (and in only a few countries,
marine corps) has begun to break down. Not
only have air operations become inseparable
from almost any action on the ground, but
naval forces increasingly deliver fire against
a wide range of ground targets. Quasi services
have begun to emerge. In all militarily sophisticated
countries special forces have grown, imitating
the highly successful models of the British
Special Air Service and its American and
Israeli counterparts. Even regular infantry
formations have adopted the tactics of special
forces--very small units, dispersion, and
the extensive use of fire brought to bear
from the air or rear areas. Other quasi services
include organizations oriented toward space
and information warfare and the horde of
civilian contractors who fix airplanes, build
bases, pay the troops, operate mess halls,
and analyze operations.
Another structural change looms. Tack an
organizational chart of an army corps on
a wall, and next to it place a similar chart
for a leading corporation of the 1950s--General
Motors, say--and the similarities stand out.
One would see in both cases a classical pyramid,
small units reporting up to progressively
smaller numbers of larger organizations.
The organization of a corps has not changed
much since then, but the cutting-edge corporation
of today is not GM but Microsoft or Motorola,
neither of which much resembles an army corps.
The modern corporation has stripped out layers
of middle management, reduced or even eliminated
many of the functional and social distinctions
between management and labor that dominated
industrial organizations, and largely abolished
the old long-term tenure and compensation
systems, including company-based pensions.
By and large, military organizations have
not done this. "Management" still
consists of commissioned and noncommissioned
officers, and although the latter play a
role quite different from that of even their
World War II counterparts, they still operate
within rank, deference, and pay structures
of a bygone time. The radical revision of
these structures will be the last manifestation
of a revolution in military affairs, and
the most difficult to implement.
THE NATURE OF COMMAND
In a period of revolutionary change in the
conduct of war, different kinds of people
not simply the same people differently trained--rise
to the top of armed services. For instance,
air power gave birth to entirely new kinds
of military organizations; unlike armies
and navies, air forces consist of a tiny
percentage of officer-warriors backed by
an elaborate array of enlisted technicians.
To take another example: in the late nineteenth
century it became clear that the increasingly
complex problem of mobilizing reservists
and deploying them over a country's railroad
network required a corps of technocratic
experts. The American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian
War demonstrated that dash and bravura could
not compete with skill at scheduling large
numbers of locomotives, handling loading
manifests, and repairing damaged track. The
logistical manager had become an indispensable
member of a general staff and a well-trained
general staff an essential feature of a military
establishment.
A similar evolution is under way today. Even
in the U.S. Air Force, an organization dominated
by pilots (bomber pilots in the 1950s and
1960s, fighter pilots thereafter), the number
of general officers in important positions
who are not combat aviators has risen. The
new technologies will increasingly bring
to the fore the expert in missile operations,
the space general, and the electronic warfare
wizard--none of them a combat specialist
in the old sense and a fair percentage of
them, sooner or later, female. Military organizations
still need, and will always need, specialists
in direct combat. Indeed, both the lethality
of direct combat and its physical and intellectual
demands have grown. But the number of such
fighters in military organizations, both
in absolute terms and in proportion to the
overall size of the militaries, has declined
steadily since the beginning of the century
and will continue to do so. The cultural
challenge for military organizations will
be to maintain a warrior spirit and the intuitive
understanding of war that goes with it, ever,
when their leaders are not, in large part,
warriors themselves.
Different eras in warfare give rise to characteristic
styles of military leadership. The age of
industrial warfare has ended, and with it
a certain kind of supreme command. Shortly
after the mobilization against Austria in
1866, an aide found the Prussian chief of
the general staff, Helmuth Graf von Moltke,
lying on a sofa reading a novel. On the evening
before D-Day, General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
supreme commander of Allied forces, could
be found on his sofa doing precisely the
same thing. Despite the 80 intervening years,
some features of supreme command remained
constant: the general in chief and his staff
assembled a vast force, planned its intricate
movements, and then spent the next day or
two letting the machine conduct its initial
operations on virtual autopilot. Today, an
aide would more likely find a field marshal
pacing back and forth in an electronic command
post, fiddling with television displays,
talking to pilots or tank commanders on the
front line by radio, and perhaps even peeking
over their shoulders through remote cameras.
That the modern field marshal can sit invisibly
in the cockpit with a pilot or perch cybernetically
in the hatch of a tank commander raises a
profound problem of centralization of authority.
Although all military organizations pay lip
service to delegation of maximum authority
to the lowest levels of command, few military
leaders can resist the temptation to dabble
in their subordinates' business. The easier
it is for them to find out what that business
is, even though they are 10,000 miles away,
the more likely they are to do so. Political
leaders will have the same capability, and
although for the moment most of them show
little inclination to meddle, one can imagine
situations in which they would choose otherwise.
THE POWER OF STATES
Few subjects exercise historians of early
modern Europe more than the military revolution
of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Yet all would agree that that period's remarkable
set of changes profoundly altered the relative
balance of power between Europe and the rest
of the world in Europe's favor. The creation
of modern military organizations-that is,
armies led by professional officers, trained
and organized according to impersonal standards
of discipline and behavior--coupled with
the appearance of governments that could
mobilize both soldiers and financial resources,
changed the international system. The rise
of Holland and the decline of the Ottoman
Empire represent the opposite extremes of
the consequences of the revolution.
The contemporary revolution in military affairs
offers tremendous opportunities to countries
that can afford to acquire expensive modern
weaponry and the skills to use it properly.
An accurate measurement of Israel's power
potential relative to its Arab neighbors,
for example, would probably show a steep
rise since 1973. Taiwan, Singapore, and Australia,
to take just three examples, can do far more
against potential opponents than would have
been thinkable 30 years ago. As we have seen,
the military leadership of the Soviet Union
believed the revolutionary changes it saw
coming would put it at a disadvantage. Indeed,
only the United States, with its vast accumulation
of military capital, better than four times
the defense budget of the next leading power,
and an unsurpassed ability to integrate large,
complicated technological systems, can fully
exploit this revolution.
Transformation in one area of military affairs
does not, however, mean the irrelevance of
all others. Just as nuclear weapons did not
render conventional power obsolete, this
revolution will not render guerrilla tactics,
terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction
obsolete. Indeed, the reverse may be true:
where unconventional bypasses to conventional
military power exist, any country confronting
the United States will seek them out. The
phenomenon of the persistence of older systems
in the midst of revolutionary change occurs
even at a tactical level. After the arrival
of the carrier as the capital ship of naval
warfare, for example, the venerable battleship
did not disappear but instead acquired two
important roles: shore bombardment platform
and vast floating air defense battery. Battleships
were part of the American fleet as recently
as the Persian Gulf War, almost half a century
after their day as the queens of naval warfare
had passed.
To the extent that the revolution proceeds
from forces in the civilian world, the potential
will exist for new military powers to emerge
extremely rapidly. A country like Japan or,
in a few years, China will quickly translate
civilian technological power into its military
equivalent. An analogy might be Germany's
acquisition of a modern air force in the
space of less than a decade in the 1930s.
At a time when civilian and military aviation
technologies did not diverge too greatly,
Germany could take the strongest civilian
aviation industry in Europe and within a
few years convert it into enormous military
power, much as the United States would do
a few years later with its automobile industry.
After a long interval during the Cold War
when military industry became an exotic and
separate entity, the pendulum has begun to
swing back, and economic strength may again
prove easily translatable into military power.
THE CHANGING ORDER
Revolutionary change in the art of war stems
not simply from the ineluctable march of
technology but from an adaptation of the
military instrument to political purposes.
The subject of armored warfare languished
in Great Britain and France between the world
wars because those governments saw little
need for an operationally offensive force
on the continent. The powers that contemplated
offensives to regain lost territories or
to seize new ones the Soviet Union and Germany--developed
the armored instrument more fully than other
states.
The United States may drive the revolution
in military affairs, but only if it has a
clear conception of what it wants military
power for--which it does not now have. Indeed,
when the Clinton administration formulated
its defense policy in 1993 it came up with
the Bottom-Up Review, which provided for
a force capable of fighting simultaneously
two regional wars assumed to resemble the
Gulf War of 1991. By structuring its analysis
around enemy forces similar to those of Iraq
in that year armor-heavy, with a relatively
large conventional but third-rate air force--it
guaranteed a conservatism in military thought
at odds with the thorough reexamination promised
by the administration early in its tenure.
For this reason, among others, the revolution
will take far longer to consummate than the
Soviets predicted in the 1980s. Barring the
pressure of a severe competition between
the United States and some state capable
of posing a real challenge to it, even available
technologies are unlikely to be exploited
fully. Military institutions in peacetime
will normally evolve rather than submit to
radical change.
World politics will also shape the revolution.
One feature will certainly be the predominance
of conventional warfare for limited objectives.
Until the end of the Cold War, the possibility
of total war, as in the great struggles of
the first half of this century, dominated
the planning of the American and Soviet military
establishments, and perhaps others as well.
With some exceptions, military action for
limited ends seems more likely in the years
ahead.
The most useful metaphor for the future military
order may be a medieval one. During the Middle
Ages, as at present, sovereignty did not
reside exclusively in states but was diffused
among political, civic, and religious bodies
states, but also sub- and supra-state entities.
Warfare was not, as it has been in the modern
period, an affair almost exclusively of states,
but one that also involved private entities
such as religious orders and other associations.
Then, unlike during the past two centuries,
military technology varied widely among combatants--an
army of English bowmen and knights fought
very differently from the Arab warriors of
Saladin or the Mongol cavalry of Genghis
Khan or the pike-wielding peasantry of Switzerland.
Militaries defied comparison; their strength
varied greatly depending on where and whom
they were fighting.
Opacity in the matter of military power may
prove one of the most troubling features
of the current revolution. The wildly inaccurate
predictions of casualties in the Gulf War
from responsible and experienced observers
(including military estimators, let it be
noted) reflected not conservatism or incompetence
but a disjunction between the realities of
military power and conventional means of
measuring it. Numbers of tanks, airplanes,
and soldiers and more elaborate firepower-based
measurements of military might were always
questionable, but now they say almost nothing
about real military effectiveness. As platforms
become less important and the quality of
munitions and, above all, the ability to
handle information become more so, analysts
will find it ever more difficult to assess
the military balance of opposing sides. If
Admiral Owens is right, the revolution in
military affairs may bring a kind of tactical
clarity to the battlefield, but at the price
of strategic obscurity.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
God may not always have been on the side
of the bigger battalions, as the saying went,
but victory usually was. Future technologies,
however, may create pockets of military capability
that will allow very small states to hold
off larger ones, much as companies of Swiss
pikemen could stop armies sweeping through
their mountain passes or a single, well-fortified
castle could hold immensely larger forces
at bay for months. Herein lies a potential
challenge even for the United States, which
will find itself attempting to project military
power for limited purposes and at a low cost
in materiel and lives. Other parties may
well decide to inflict some hard, if not
fatal, blows to stave off American intervention.
For stymieing the American advantage in the
megasystems of modern military power--fantastically
expensive and effective aircraft carriers
or satellites, for example the microsystems
of modern military technology, such as the
cruise missile, may prove sufficient.
The predominance of warfare for limited objectives,
the availability of vast quantities of centralized
information, and the obscurity of military
power may combine to make civil-military
relations more awkward. Politicians will
seek to use means they can readily see, as
it were, but do not understand; generals
will themselves be handling forces they do
not fully comprehend and will be divided
on the utility of various forms of military
power.
In every previous period of revolutionary
change in the conduct of war, military leaders
made large mistakes. The human toll on European
armies coming to terms with modern firepower
in World War I reflected not only, or even
primarily, the incompetence of generals but
their bafflement in the face of new conditions
of warfare. Less costly but no less time-consuming
was the difficulty the U.S. Navy had developing
the multi-carrier task forces that would
ultimately enable it to sweep the Pacific
clear of Japanese forces in World War II.
The lesson of the 1942 Battle of Midway had
appeared to be that the massing of carriers
offered great advantages but posed no lesser
vulnerabilities, should the defending side
be caught while rearming its strike aircraft.
As a result, the transformation of naval
warfare by the carrier could not be realized
until one side either felt overwhelming pressure
to mass carriers despite the risks the case
in the early part of the war--or had enough
carriers to make the risks bearable. For
the United States the latter did not occur
until almost two years after it entered the
war, when the naval building program had
produced the sheer numbers of vessels adequate
for large-scale carrier operations.
A revolution in military affairs is under
way. It will require changes of a magnitude
that military people still do not completely
grasp and political leaders do not fully
imagine. For the moment, it appears to offer
the United States the prospect of military
power beyond that of any other country on
the planet, now and well into the next century.
Small wonder, then, that by and large American
theorists have embraced the idea of a revolution
in warfare as an opportunity for their country,
as indeed it is. But revolution implies rapid,
violent, and, above all, unpredictable change.
Clio has a number of lessons to teach Mars,
but perhaps none is more important than that.
One of the few essays that does so is Peter
Paret, "Revolutions in Warfare: An Earlier
Generation of Interpreters," in Bernard
Brodie, Michael D. Intrilligator, and Roman
Kolkowicz, eds., National Security and International
Stability, Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn
& Hain, 1983, pp. 157-69. See also Andrew
F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer,"
The National Interest, Fall 1994, pp. 30-42.
Albert C. Wedemeyer, "Memorandum: German
General Staff School Report,"July n,
1938, p. 12. This is one of the most insightful
accounts of the temper and tone of the German
army before World War II. See also the masterly
survey in Herbert Rosinski, The German Army,
London: Hogarth Press, 1939.
ILLUSTRATION
~~~~~~~~
By Eliot A. Cohen
ELIOT A. COHEN is Professor of Strategic
Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies, The Johns Hopkins
University.
http://weblinks2.epnet.com/resultlist.asp?tb=1&_ua=bt+ID++FAF+shn+1+db+buhjnh+bo+B%5F+30F7&_ug=sid+5ED83B01%2D9F03%2D4539%2DA6AC%2D285B3C6251C7%40sessionmgr2+dbs+buh+91BD&_us=dstb+KS+ri+KAAACB1D00144013+fcl+Aut+sm+KS+sl+%2D1+0754&_uh=btn+N+6C9C&_uso=st%5B0+%2DJN++%22Foreign++Affairs%22++and++DT++19960301+tg%5B0+%2D+db%5B0+%2Dbuh+op%5B0+%2D+hd+False+DA9B&lfr=Hierarchical+Journal
２，Adelphi Summary: Volume 318, April 1998
The Revolution in Strategic Affairs
Lawrence Freedman
３，Transforming the Military. By: Rumsfeld,
Donald H.. Foreign Affairs, May/Jun2002,
Vol. 81 Issue 3, p20, 13p;
４，America's information edge. By: Nye Jr.,
Joseph S.; Owens, William A.. Foreign Affairs,
Mar/Apr96, Vol. 75 Issue 2, p20, 17p,
５，Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military
Affairs and the Evidence of History (Strategic
Studies)
ｂｙ Colin S. Gray
６，Military Transformation: A Strategic
Approach
Office of Force Transformation
７，The Dynamics of Military Revolution,
1300-2050
Macgregor Knox
８，Thinking About Revolutions in Military
Affairs
By Williamson Murray
９，Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military
Revolutions
By Andrew F. Krepinevich.
RMAの授業でマーシャルについて調べます．
http://www.comw.org/qdr/0107lemann.html
http://www.comw.org/qdr/0105DerDerian1.html
http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2001/02/vest-j-02-15.html
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/marshall.html
http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi=19991025&s=19991025silversteinside
戦略学 第十一週目
１，Walter Laqueur "Postmodern Terrorism"
Foreign Affairs (Sept/Oct 1996)
２，-------------- "Left, Right, and
Beyond: The changing face of Terror"
in James HOge and Gideon Rose, eds, 'How
Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War'(2001)
p 71-82.
３，Bruce Hoffman "Inside Terrorism"(1998)
４，Lawrence Freedman "Terrorism and
Strategy" in Freedman et al., "Terrorism
and International Order"(1986)
５，Lawrence Freedman "The Third World
War?" Survival (Winter 2001)
戦略学で使われるテキストの説明
V LITERATURE
It is highly likely that for a while, at
least, many items in the reading lists below
will not be easily accessible to students
from the University or departmental libraries.
So much for the bad news. The better news
is that most of what is important either
is available or is on order by the Library,
while literally everything on these lists
is available from Professor Gray (if he is
not using it himself, that week!) Because
of the predictable difficulty with some items,
the reading lists err on the generous side
so as to guide students to alternative sources.
There is a Politics and International Relations
department library in a room leading off
the Politics Office (next to the GIPIS Office).
In addition to a few books and monographs
on strategic studies on the shelves, there
is also a ‘course box’ for this course,
which contains some ‘hard to find’ items.
There are two textbooks for the course: John
Baylis et al, eds., Strategy in the Contemporary
World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies
(2002); and Colin S Gray, Modern Strategy
(1999). Because Baylis covers most of the
topics, it is not cited below for specific
seminars.
The most relevant strategic history is presented
usefully in Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory
(1996), and John J Weltman, World Politics
and the Evolution of War (1995). Other books
of particular importance for much of the
course include: Carl von Clausewitz, On War
(1832; Howard and Paret, trans) (1976) which
is THE CLASSIC, see especially the 1993 Everyman
edn; Michael I Handel, Masters of War 3rd
edn (2001), which analyses the classics;
Williamson Murray et al, eds, The Making
of Strategy (1994), ranges from ancient Greece
to the 1980’s; while Peter Paret, ed, Makers
of Modern Strategy (1986), is a modern classic,
reissued in 1999 by OUP. Gerard Chaliand,
ed., The Art of War in World History (1994),
and Lawrence Freedman, ed, War (1994) are
wide-ranging excellent anthologies. All of
these are in paperback.
Other useful collections of essays include
the following:
John Baylis, et al Contemporary Strategy,
I, Theories and Concepts, 2nd edn. (1987)
Philip Bobbit, et al, eds US Nuclear Strategy:
A Reader (1989)
John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Oxford Companion
to American Military
ed. History (1999).
Trevor N Dupuy, ed. International Military
and Defense Encyclopaedia (6 vols) (1993)
Edward Mead Earle, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy:
From Machiavelli to Hitler (1941)
Lawrence Freedman, et al War, Strategy and
International Politics (1992)
eds.
Michael I Handel, ed. “Clausewitz and Modern
Strategy”, The Journal of Strategic Studies,
Special Issue (June/Sept 1986)
Michael Howard The Causes of Wars and Other
Essays (1983)
Michael Howard Studies in War and Peace (1970)
Michael Howard, ed. The Theory and Practice
of War (1965)
Paul Kennedy, ed. Grand Strategies in War
and Peace (1991)
Bradford A Lee & Strategic Logic and
Political Rationality (2003)
Karl F Walling, eds
Allan R Millett and Military Effectiveness
(3 vols, on World War I,
Williamson Murray, eds. the Inter-War Years,
and World War II, 1988)
Be aware of the standard easy reference to
(all of) military history, R Ernest Dupuy
and Trevor N Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopaedia
of Military History: From 3500 BC to the
Present, 4th edn. (1993)
By a wide margin, the most useful journal
is International Security. Also valuable
are The Journal of Strategic Studies, Security
Studies, Survival and the Adelphi Papers
published by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies in London, Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest,
Strategic Review, Comparative Strategy, World
Politics and Orbis. Do not neglect the professional
military journals, especially Parameters,
Naval War College Review, RUSI Journal, U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, Airpower Journal,
Military Review, Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)
and Defence Studies.
The following are a few useful websites:
www.clausewitz.com; www.defenselink.mil is
the official website of U.S. DoD, add on
/execsec/adr2002/index.htm for the DoD’s
Annual Report (2002); http://www.whitehouse.gov/nse/nsc.pdf
will get you the Capstone U.S. National Security
Strategy document; http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine
is the U.S. joint doctrine website that will
get you Joint Force Quarterly; for the important
U.S. Army War College Journal, Parameters,
go to http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters;
for the U.S. Naval War College Review, go
to http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press; also useful
is the homepage of the U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, for their monographs,
on-line http://www.carlisle.army.mil/.
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去年のテスト問題
安全保障学
http://www.reading.ac.uk/Repol/ExamPapers04/PIM18%202003-4%20A%20001.pdf
戦略学
http://www.reading.ac.uk/Repol/ExamPapers04/PIM11%202003-4%20A%20001.pdf
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おまけ：イギリス生活便利サイト
http://www5a.biglobe.ne.jp/~london/linkco.htm
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